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Jonathan P. Caulkins‡
Mark A.R. Kleiman*

Abstract
Most proposals for legalizing cannabis production and sale ban
sales to minors. But such bans are not self-executing. There is at least
the risk—if not the overwhelming probability—that legal availability
for adults will change price and availability for minors in a way that
will increase the prevalence of underage use. This is especially problematic with respect to use by younger adolescents and to heavy use.
It might be possible, with vigorous enforcement, to reduce the impact
of legalization on use by minors, but the costs and unwanted side
effects of such efforts may make them, on balance, inadvisable. The
example of alcohol shows that it is possible to make it difficult for
minors to buy directly from licensed stores and that doing so reduces
alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harms in the target population. But strong efforts to prevent minors from buying cannabis illegally from adults, who in turn buy it from licensed stores, may not be
advisable. With minors now accounting for approximately 25 percent
of the volume in the cannabis markets, giving strictly illicit producers
and vendors a firmer grip on the underage market would undermine
the goal of reducing illicit-market harms, including violence, the need
for enforcement, and the supply of products of uncertain potency,
perhaps containing harmful contaminants. If this is so, then the
harms associated with increased juvenile use are not entirely separable
from the decision to make cannabis lawfully available to adults.
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Introduction
As states, led by Colorado and Washington and now joined by
Alaska and Oregon, begin to legalize commercial production and sale
of cannabis, one concern is the risk of increasing use among minors. In
the Department of Justice guidance on prosecution of state-legal
cannabis-related activity, controlling access to minors is listed among
the eight federal priorities.
Most legalization proposals—including those passed in Colorado
and Washington—forbid sales to purchasers under twenty-one,
matching the rule about alcohol in all fifty states. But making a rule
does not ensure that the rule will produce its desired results. Legally
produced cannabis will still reach minors, either because minors
succeed in purchasing directly from licensed outlets or because adult
buyers illegally give or resell what they have legally purchased.
The appropriate policy response is not obvious. If efforts to limit
access are inevitably flawed, how vigorously should they be pursued?
Should efforts focus only on suppressing store purchase or extend to
include “gray markets”—meaning the diversion of product that would
be legal for adults? These tensions also exist with alcohol and
tobacco, but cannabis is different inasmuch as there already exists a
large illicit supply system able and willing to deliver cannabis
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products to minors. Suppressing gray-market access could
inadvertently bolster that purely illicit market, undercutting two
prime goals of cannabis legalization: reducing illicit activity and
reducing cannabis-related arrests.
This Article identifies three policy alternatives and contrasts their
pros and cons. An “aggressive” approach seeks to suppress cannabis
supply through all channels, even if in vain. A “permissive” approach
grudgingly tolerates gray market access as preferable to black market
supply. A “long game” approach begins permissively, waiting until the
illicit market shrinks to some target level from which it might not
easily rebound, and then imposes “aggressive” controls on all
channels.

I. Background
Cannabis legalization appears increasingly to be a question of
when and how, not whether. Washington and Colorado became the
first jurisdictions to legalize commercial production, distribution, and
sale of large-scale quantities for nonmedical use in 20121; Uruguay did
so in 20132; Alaska and Oregon followed suit in 20143; and other
states and nations are likely to follow.4 Just more than half of
Americans (51%) support legalizing cannabis use.5
Designing legal cannabis regimes requires policymakers to weigh
competing goals, project the effectiveness and unintended consequences of tactical choices, and perhaps consider some unorthodox
strategies. Here we consider one such unorthodoxy: the possibility
that legal-cannabis regimes should not try very hard to prevent youth
from obtaining cannabis from cannabis stores, at least indirectly.
That stands in complete contrast to all the received wisdom from the
alcohol and tobacco literatures, but we argue that such a seemingly
1.

Maia Szalavitz, Two U.S. States Become First to Legalize Marijuana,
Time (Nov. 7, 2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/11/07/two-u-sstates-become-first-to-legalize-marijuana/.

2.

Daniel Cancel, Uruguay Becomes World’s First Nation to Legalize
Marijuana, Bloomberg (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/ne
ws/articles/2013-12-11/uruguay-becomes-world-s-first-nation-to-legalizemarijuana-trade.

3.

Josh Barro, D.C., Oregon and Alaska Vote to Legalize Marijuana, N.Y.
Times (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/upshot/marij
uana-on-the-ballot-in-florida-alaska-oregon-and-dc.html?abt=0002&abg=1.

4.

Washington, D.C. legalized possession and home-growing in 2014, but
that is an entirely different matter than legalizing a for-profit industry,
which is what raises much greater concerns with youth access.

5.

Lydia Saad, Majority Continues to Support Pot Legalization in U.S.,
Gallup (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179195/majoritycontinues-support-pot-legalization.aspx.
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perverse strategy may make a certain pragmatic sense, at least in the
short to medium run.

II. Harms and Policies
In drug policy discussions it is often useful to distinguish among
alternative means of reducing total drug-related harm: prevalence
reduction, quantity reduction, and harm (or harmfulness) reduction.6
If the only goal were to minimize youth use, it might be advisable to
restrict all kinds of access to the maximum extent possible. However,
even if one could somehow prevent twenty-one-year-olds from making
proxy buys on behalf of their under-twenty-year-old friends, many of
those under-twenty-year-olds might simply continue their current
practice of buying on the black market.
Black markets generate substantial harms above and beyond mere
provision of the substance. Those harms include crime, violence, and
corruption, but also a potentially more dangerous product, since
black-market cannabis is not quality-tested or labeled for potency. So
cannabis control policy faces a dilemma: minimizing the number of
underage cannabis users might not minimize total harm once one
factors in the harms of the black market.
State and federal policies stress the importance of preventing
increases in underage access. Their manifestations thus far focus on
deterring state-licensed stores from selling to underage users, by way
of frequent inspections and available sanctions. But these policies are
not fully fleshed out and are likely to be guided also by competing
goals, such as avoiding youth criminalization and reducing black
market activity. (One of many unresolved questions with cannabis
policy is how to define an “underage cannabis user.” Our usage of
“underage” will follow Washington’s and Colorado’s law, since we
suspect that their decision to make twenty-one the minimum legal age
may be emulated in future legislation.)

III. Outline
The basic goals and frameworks of state-level cannabis control
policy are outlined in Part IV.
It is another question entirely to ask whether any given strategy
will be successful in furthering its stated goals. That depends on how
users respond to prohibition tactics and also how producers and
distributors in the black and gray markets respond to enforcement
pressure and to changing economic tides. For instance, if one method
6.

See Robert J. MacCoun, Toward a Psychology of Harm Reduction, 53
Am. Psychologist 1199 (1988) (discussing the different “overlapping
drug control strategies” of prevalence reduction, quantity reduction, and
harm reduction).
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of underage access is blocked, will that lower youth use of cannabis,
or will youth simply access via other channels? Will the answer for
today be the same as for ten years from now, when the legal cannabis
economy is better established? Part V considers these dynamics.
These issues are not unique to cannabis. Though cannabis has
frequently been compared with alcohol—as in the tagline of
Colorado’s Amendement Sixty-Four, “The Regulate Marijuana Like
Alcohol Act”—in some respects a better comparison may be with
tobacco. Cannabis currently supports a thriving black market; alcohol
does not. Indeed, there remains considerable black market activity
even in the two states that have already established legal markets.
The mere act of legalization does not necessarily lead all criminals
who had been supplying that drug to retire immediately.
Tobacco is an intermediate case, with little to no black market
but a substantial “gray market,” meaning illegal distribution and sale
of product that is legally produced. Gray-market activity helps youth
evade age prohibitions and all users evade taxes. Furthermore, there
is the very real possibility that today’s tobacco companies may move
into the marijuana product space after national legalization.7 Part VI
reviews evidence on the effectiveness of retail enforcement intended to
control youth access to alcohol and tobacco. Part VII applies these
lessons to cannabis control in Washington and Colorado, showing
where control efforts might be better or worse advantaged.
A reasonable policy response would consider all these competing
goals and form hypotheses about the intended and unintended effects
from different tactics. Part VIII proceeds accordingly. First, it identifies two dichotomous policy responses: an “aggressive” approach that
attempts to combat all channels of cannabis access simultaneously
and a “permissive” approach that tolerates some gray market access
but maintains a strict prohibition on black-market sale. Later, we
introduce another variant: a “patient” approach, which begins as
permissive but later imposes aggressive-style controls.

IV. State and Federal Policies to Limit Underage Use
Even if one believes legalization can outperform prohibition, it
still has disadvantages. So legalization schemes should be designed in
ways that reduce those potential drawbacks—perhaps the most
important of which is increased use, abuse, and dependence.

7.

Rachel Ann Barry, Heikki Hiilamo & Stanton A. Glantz, Waiting for
the Opportune Moment: The Tobacco Industry and Marijuana Legalization, 92 Milbank Q. 207, 226–27 (2014). Since the 1970s, tobacco
companies have expressed some interest in the cannabis industry,
sometimes as a potential rival and sometimes as a potential industry
which to enter. Id.
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Use has been rising in the U.S. as policies have eased over the
nearly twenty years since California first legalized medical cannabis in
1996. “There are about seven times more heavy users now than there
were in 1992.”8 Just over the past decade, the number of past-year
and past-month users has increased by nearly 50 percent, and total
annual use days doubled, since the number of people using daily or
near-daily has increased even faster than has overall prevalence.9
Harms are also up; the number of emergency department visits in
which cannabis was mentioned increased by 70 percent between 2004
and 2011, approaching half a million per year.10
Underage use has also increased, although not as sharply:11 21.2%
of high school seniors reported past-month use in 2014, up from
historic lows of 18.3% in 2006 and an even lower 11.9% in 1992, but
lower than the 25.2% mark in 2012 and 2013.12 Consumption by
individuals under twenty-one accounts for between one-fifth and
one-third of U.S. cannabis consumption.13
What can be done about that? One well-accepted strategy for
reducing underage alcohol and tobacco use is limiting underage access,
and the same would be expected to apply to cannabis.14 Monitoring
the Future data show that among tenth graders, two-thirds report
that cannabis is “very easy” or “fairly easy” to get—similar to the
8.

Mark A.R. Kleiman, The Other Way to Legalize Marijuana, Slate
(Nov. 4, 2014, 1:29 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_poli
tics/politics/2014/11/d_c_marijuana_legalization_initiative_71_is_go
ing_to_pass_and_could_show.html.

9.

RAND Corp., What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs:
2000–2010, at 47–51 (2014).

10.

Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Data Supplement 2013, at 58 (2013).

11.

Youth use has increased substantially among both youth who smoke
cigarettes and those who do not, but there has been a sharp decline in
tobacco smoking among youth, so the aggregate prevalence of marijuana
use among all youth has not risen nearly so rapidly.

12.

Press Release, University of Michigan News Service, Use of Alcohol,
Cigarettes, and a Number of Illicit Drugs Declines Among U.S. Teens
tbl.3 (Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Teen Use Press Release], http://www.
monitoringthefuture.org/pressreleases/14drugpr_complete.pdf.

13.

See Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., Results
from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health:
Summary of National Findings (2013) [hereinafter SAMHSA],
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/SAMHDA/sda (authors’ calculations).

14.

Rosalie Liccardo Pacula et al., Developing Public Health Regulations for
Marijuana: Lessons from Alcohol and Tobacco, 104 Am. J. Pub.
Health 1021, 1022 (2014). A regulatory approach to cannabis can learn
from previous approaches to alcohol and tobacco, including taking as a
goal the reduction of youth access.
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corresponding proportions for cigarettes (69%) and alcohol (75%) and
dramatically higher than for “hard drugs” like cocaine (16%), heroin
(11%), and methamphetamine (10%).15
On paper, Washington and Colorado have responded vigorously.
Their laws have embraced a number of public health regulations
intended to limit underage use of alcohol and tobacco: a twenty-oneyear minimum age to purchase; bans against cannabis vendors selling
non-cannabis products; bans on underage entry to cannabis stores;
restricting availability of retail licenses; bans against retail stores
within 1,000 feet of schools, parks, or other public places; and
restrictions on advertising, particularly if targeting youth.
The federal government has likewise made its priorities clear. In
August 2013 it signaled willingness to allow states to proceed with
regulated cannabis markets but threatened to enforce the federal drug
laws against cannabis distribution unless states meet eight guidelines
concerning public health and safety, including “[p]reventing the
distribution of marijuana to minors.”16
Whether in anticipation of or simply in common purpose with this
federal position, Washington and Colorado have been vocal about
plans to prevent youth from purchasing from cannabis stores. A pillar
of their strategy is to enforce underage purchasing laws by using
minors in “controlled buys” of cannabis, as illustrated by statements
from Colorado Department of Revenue official: “‘This is going to be a
big focus of our field enforcement going forward’”17; and from the
Washington Liquor Control Board’s enforcement chief: “Of course the
feds are looking at a tightly regulated market around youth access,
and I think this shows we’re being responsible.”18
Presumably, policymakers in Washington and Colorado are also
considering methods to prevent the gray market diversion of cannabis,
perhaps by enforcing laws prohibiting underage possession, use, and
purchase (“PUP”) or arresting and/or shaming consenting adults
from state-licensed cannabis to underage users. That stance has not

15.

Teen Use Press Release, supra note 12, at tbl.3.

16.

Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All U.S.
Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 1 (Aug. 29,
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382
9132756857467.pdf?utm_source=publish2&utm_medium=referral&utm
_campaign=www.kpbs.org.

17.

Fred Dreier, Underage Recreational Cannabis Sales Targeted in “Secret
Shopper” Program, Marijuana Business Daily (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://mmjbusinessdaily.com/colorado-gov-rolls-out-secret-shopperprogram/.

18.

Bob Young, Underage Enforcers Will Try to Sting New Pot Stores,
Seattle Times (Nov. 29, 2013), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnew
s/2022364828_potstingsxml.html.
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yet been taken—at least not publicly—but remains available and
might be adopted in the future.
A. Other Goals

Yet, underage use is not the only concern relevant to cannabis
legalization; nor is it necessarily the most important. On this point,
states, the federal government, and the public agree. This has been
manifested in legal documents. The texts of Initiative 502, Amendment Sixty-Four, and Department of Justice enforcement priorities
mention a number of other issues such as state and local tax revenue;
removing cannabis distribution from the hands of criminal organizations; individual freedom; and the efficient use of law enforcement
resources. Below we considered three goals relevant to different policy
responses, which may at times compete with the goal of reducing
underage use.
B. Avoiding the Criminalization of Youth and Adults

The policing of cannabis production and distribution generates
significant, though often exaggerated, tolls in arrests and incarceration. Several tens of thousands of people are currently incarcerated for
cannabis distribution, and roughly 100,000 are arrested annually.19 If,
after legalization, a black market persists to serve underage users,
some amount of this enforcement and associated costs will also likely
continue.
Yet, even if arrests for production and distribution went to zero,
the total number of cannabis arrests could still increase. The great
majority of cannabis arrests are for possession rather than for drug
sale or manufacture. Some types of possession or use remain illegal
(e.g., use in public, possession in excess of allowed quantities) and so
will continue to send adults to jail. Enforcement of rules and regulations can be a non-negligible source of criminalization: every year in
the United States, nearly 700,000 more arrests are made for alcohol
violations than for drug law violations of all kinds (not just
cannabis).20
Youth arrests are of special interest. Arrest for possession by
those under twenty-one will presumably continue and, if prohibitions
19.

Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Marijuana Legalization: What
Everyone Needs to Know 47–50 (2012). “About 40,000 state and
federal prison inmates have a current conviction involving cannabis;
perhaps half of those are in prison on cannabis offenses only.” Id. at 50.

20.

See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States
2012, at tbl.29, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/
2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/29tabledatadecpdf. The FBI reports
that in 2012 there were an estimated 1,552,432 arrests for (non-alcoholrelated) “drug abuse violations,” compared with 1,282,957 for (alcoholrelated) “driving under the influence,” 441,532 for “liquor laws,” and
511,271 for “drunkenness.” Id.
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are aggressively enforced, even increase. That pattern has already
been demonstrated by the experience with alcohol: increases in the
alcohol minimum age from eighteen to twenty-one have been
associated with increased rates of arrest in that age range.21 In states
with laws against possession, use, and purchase, either pertaining to
alcohol or to tobacco, arrests and prosecutions are disproportionately
focused on minors rather than adults or retailers.22
C. Eliminating Black Markets and Improving Public Safety

So long as they are operating, illicit cannabis markets fund
criminal organizations. They even create opportunities and incentives
for violence, albeit to a much lesser extent than do the markets for
cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine.23 Still, a study published by
the RAND Corporation estimated that the cannabis trade delivered
$1.5 billion in revenues to Mexican drug trafficking organizations,
accounting for 15–26 percent of their drug-related revenues.24 While
some black market cannabis is grown domestically, historically much
has been imported from Mexico. One of the principle appeals of
legalization is the potential to undermine these black markets. Yet,
were the approximately one-fifth to one-quarter of demand that comes
from underage users still met with black market supplies, that would
diminish this important potential benefit of legalization. Likewise, any

21.

Mark Wolfson & Mary Hourigan, Unintended Consequences and Professional Ethics: Criminalization of Alcohol and Tobacco Use by Youth
and Young Adults, 92 Addiction 1159, 1161 (1997).

22.

See Alexander C. Wagenaar & Mark Wolfson, Enforcement of the Legal
Minimum Drinking Age in the United States, 15 J. Pub. Health Pol’y
37, 45 (1994) (noting that based on detailed data for Oregon, Kentucky,
Michigan, and Montana, for every 1,000 arrests of a minor for underage
possession of alcohol, there were only 88 adults over the age of twentyone arrested and 130 retailers sanctioned or warned for supplying
alcohol to underage users); see also Jean L. Forster et al., Survey of City
Ordinances and Local Enforcement Regarding Commercial Availability
of Tobacco to Minors in Minnesota, United States, 5 Tobacco Control 46, 49–50 (1996) (showing that “more than 90% of cities reported
some action to enforce the law against tobacco purchase, possession, or
use by minors . . . This is especially noteworthy compared to 25% of
cities that reported some enforcement action against merchants for
selling tobacco to minors, and less than 10% where penalties were
applied”).

23.

See Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter, Towards a Harm-Reduction
Approach to Enforcement, 8 Safer Communities 9, 15–16 (2009)
(discussing the differences in risks of harm in various forms of drug
dealing).

24.

Beau Kilmer et al., Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and
Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California
Help? 3 (2010).
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effort that quickens the demise of black market activity in turn
reduces these dangers.
D. Introducing Cannabis Public Health Regulations

There is considerable speculation about the safety of legal
cannabis relative to black market cannabis. On the one hand, all
cannabis is a dependence-inducing intoxicant, regardless of whether it
is sold through state-regulated stores or the black market. On the
other hand, those states with legal cannabis require it be tested and
labeled for product potency (i.e., percentage of THC, CBD, and other
active ingredients) and purity (e.g., absence of mold, mites,
pesticides). Further, in its nonherbal forms it must be packaged to
clearly demarcate each standard 10mg THC serving size and instruct
users on safe use. Assuming that cannabis stores resemble existing
medical dispensaries, their inventory will feature edibles and concentrates, which, though they reduce damage to the lungs, can vary
wildly in their quality and potency.25 Conceptually, it might help to
think of the relative health benefits of legal cannabis in terms of
upper and lower bounds. The lower bound may actually be negative,
if one believes non-herbal cannabis to be especially dangerous and
testing and packaging regulations to be ineffective at reducing those
risks. The upper bound is certainly much lower than for a drug such
as heroin, which in its controlled form reduces risk of lethal overdose,
though may still be substantial (particularly if one believes that
potency labeling can shift popular taste toward less-potent varieties).
To the extent that cannabis continues to be purchased through black
markets rather than gray or white markets, these potential health
benefits (or arguably potential costs) are left on the table.

V. Methods of Underage Access and
Forecasts for Parallel Markets
To make cannabis control policy, it is not enough for
policymakers to choose with goals to prioritize and which to let slide.
They must question whether a policy is likely to achieve its stated
goal; further, will there be important secondary outcomes? Ultimately
the answers will come down to circumstantial details, including how
underage users respond to prohibition tactics and how methods of
cannabis supply respond to changing demand and economic factors.
Precisely how youth access cannabis can be viewed along several
dimensions: origin of supply, relationship with the immediate
25.

Annie Lowrey, Now 20% More Heady, N.Y. Times Mag., May 18,
2014, at 16. Among Colorado medical dispensaries, many cannabis
products are not tested for potency and, even then, are not often done
so accurately.
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provider, and nature of the transaction. The National Survey on Drug
Use and Health (“NSDUH”) asks users how they most recently
acquired cannabis. Among past-month users under age twenty-one,
nearly all (88%) accessed from friends or family and many of them for
free (44%). Only 10 percent reported purchasing from a stranger.26
(This general pattern is not new.27)
Here, the origin of supply is almost entirely from cannabis black
markets; only a tiny, but increasing, fraction of cannabis users report
buying from a medical dispensary or growing their own. Cannabis
black markets are of enormous scale, having recently displaced cocaine as the largest illegal drug market in the United States and are
estimated to serve eighteen to twenty-five million past-month users
with revenues of $30–60 billion.28 Underage users are not only welcome into that market—with Monitoring the Future data showing
that two-thirds of tenth graders reporting that cannabis is “very easy”
or “fairly easy” to get—29but underage users are also a significant
portion of the entire market, as consumption by individuals under
twenty-one accounts for slightly less than one-quarter of U.S. cannabis consumption.30
This might change under legalization, since it opens a new and
legal source of supply.31 Adults purchasing from those sources are
taking part in what might be called the “white market.” But many
other adults do not. Others may continue to take to black markets to
purchase cannabis that has been produced wholly outside these new
legal frameworks. Though underage users are prohibited by law from
the new market, still some will gain access via the “gray market,” in
which adults buy legally from stores and then resell or give the drug
away to youth and young adults who are under twenty-one. This
occurs today with alcohol and tobacco, and so underage drinking and
smoking continues even without relying on black market supply. The

26.

See SAMHSA, supra note 13 (authors’ calculations).

27.

See Jonathan P. Caulkins & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Marijuana Markets: Inferences from Reports by the Household Population, 36 J. Drug
Issues 173, 178 tbl.2 (2006) (showing that in the 2001 survey most
respondents acquired their marijuana from friends or relatives).

28.

RAND Corp., supra note 9, at 4. The upper bound for an estimate of
retail expenditures on marijuana surpassed that of cocaine in 2009.

29.

Teen Use Press Release, supra note 12, at tbl.13.

30.

See SAMHSA, supra note 10 (authors’ calculations).

31.

At present, sources of supply that are legal with respect to Colorado and
Washington law remain completely illegal with respect to federal law,
but we are writing in anticipation of a time when either federal cannabis
prohibition has been repealed or the Obama Administration’s current
policy of nonenforcement within states that have legalized has been
formalized in some manner.
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gray market functions well enough that there is little scope for purely
illegal moonshining and even less for covert tobacco farming. (Homegrowing cannabis is much more practical than home-growing
tobacco.)
Yet, the opening stages of cannabis legalization will play out with
an active black market, which might shrink in the coming years but
probably will not vanish, at least until legalization is national. For
instance, much of the cannabis produced illegally in Washington was
exported to other states even before legalization;32 legalizing supply
within Washington does nothing to reduce that demand. In a
competition between the established black market and the emerging
licit markets, the black market has the advantages of starting out
with all the customers and also cost-savings in the form of evading
state-imposed taxes on cannabis production and sale (roughly 38% in
Washington and 25% in Colorado).
In the long run, these tables will probably turn, given the
advantages of a well-capitalized and licit industry. Iowa farmers and
convenience store chains are massively more efficient at producing
and distributing consumer goods than are criminals: a RAND study
estimates that fully commercialized firms could provide cannabis at
less than one-fifth current prices, excluding taxes.33 However, that
transition may take years to complete. In the meantime, black markets offer a fallback option for youth and young adults rejected from
state-licensed stores.
So the near future for legal cannabis states will feature large but
waning black markets alongside small but growing gray markets.
Already, gray markets have emerged in medical cannabis states.
Nearly three-quarters of adolescents in substance abuse treatment in
the Denver area reported using someone else’s medical cannabis.34 And
despite the roll-out of cannabis stores in Washington and Colorado,
signs indicate the black market remains strong, or at least has not
disappeared overnight.
Neither gray nor black markets are easily eliminated by
enforcement policies, although they may be weakened. Gray markets
32.

See Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., How Much Revenue Could
the Cannabis Tax Generate, Under Different Scenarios? 25
(2013) (noting that marijuana exports could comprise a large percentage
of Washington’s marijuana revenues).

33.

See Beau Kilmer et al., Altered State? Assessing How Marijuana Legalization in California Could Influence Marijuana
Consumption and Public Budgets 18–21 (2010) (estimating future
prices for marijuana based on increased efficiencies and lowered costs of
production if marijuana were legalized).

34.

Stacy Salomonsen-Sautel et al., Medical Marijuana Use Among Adolescents in Substance Abuse Treatment, 51 J. Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 694, 697 (2012).
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are fueled by a profit opportunity that enforcement cannot easily
remove: after legalization, cannabis will remain difficult to acquire by
users under twenty-one years old but easy to acquire by adults who
can simply buy from state-licensed stores. So “proxy buyers” can
make a quick profit by arbitraging cannabis to the prohibited demographic. Indeed, this activity is so easy for tobacco and alcohol today
that many proxy buyers do not even charge for the service. Law
enforcement efforts can make that more difficult, and so harder to
make a profit doing it, but cannot resolve the underlying imbalance in
supply and demand.
So making the right decisions about enforcement policy hinges on
anticipating dynamics of gray and black market activity. The stronger
these markets, the easier for youth to circumvent restrictions against
store access via access through social networks. How these gray markets will play out in states after legalizing cannabis is still unclear and
is the central question addressed here.

VI. Lessons from Alcohol and Tobacco
The approach taken by Washington and Colorado thus far is
reminiscent of efforts with tobacco and alcohol, which proved to be
largely successful. Key to their announced efforts is a focus on deterring vendors from selling to underage users, by way of frequent
inspections and available sanctions. That focus was not stressed in
alcohol or tobacco control until the 1980s and 1990s, for instance,
with the Synar Amendment as pertaining to tobacco control.35 These
policies appeared to have substantial effects, even though compliance
is far from perfect, as the following decades saw steadily declining
rates of underage access to alcohol and tobacco.
However, correlation is not causation, and what worked for tobacco might not work for cannabis. Working from the literature on
alcohol and tobacco control, we will identify lessons concerning (1)
attempts to control store purchase and (2) alternate modes of access;
(3) the costs of enforcement; and (4) the “push-down pop-up”
dynamic across different modes of access.
We focus primarily on tobacco rather than alcohol. One reason is
the similarities between cannabis and tobacco. Tobacco is lightweight,
portable, and smokeable, and it supports significant gray- and blackmarket activity. Alcohol’s lower value-to-weight ratio makes it more
difficult to covertly transport and sell. Others might object that
alcohol is a better comparator because it has a minimum purchase age
of twenty-one years old and has already undergone a change from full
prohibition to full legalization. Thus, occasionally comparisons with
alcohol will also be helpful.
35.

ADAMHA Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 102-321, § 1926, 106 Stat.
323, 394–95 (1992).
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A. Controlling Store Access

Policies against underage store purchases can be effective only
when enforced. A 1992 Department of Health and Human Services,
Office of the Inspector General report found that even though fortyseven states had enacted laws against underage purchase of tobacco,
only two states had backed those laws with substantial enforcement.36
Shortly afterward, Congress passed the Synar Amendment to the
Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Act, which requires (and monitors) state enforcement of tobacco
laws, including undercover buys against vendors.37 This yielded impressive results. Nationwide retailer violation rates as measured from
undercover buys dropped from 40.1% in the first year of reporting
(1997) to 25.4% in 1998, and since 2006 they have remained between
8.5% and 10.9%.38 The same trend is apparent in youth self-reports of
cigarette availability, although not as strongly. Monitoring the Future
asked students, “How difficult do you think it would be for you to get
cigarettes, if you wanted some?” The percentage of tenth graders
answering “fairly easy” or “very easy” peaked at 91 percent in 1996,
dropped to 87 percent by 2000, and since has continued to steadily
drop through to 69 percent in 2014.39
Though these gains are real, there are some caveats. Lancaster
and Stead argue that vendor compliance rates might not materially
affect underage access to store purchase until they’re pushed above 80
percent, since youth can do a number of things that inspectors
cannot, including using fake IDs, visiting multiple stores, establishing
familiarity with vendors, and targeting those stores with reputations
for not checking ID.40 Moreover, youth often resell or share what they
acquire to their friends, and so a small number of noncompliant stores
can supply a large number of underage users.
So some youth will feel these effects more than others. Older
youth and more frequent users are more likely to access tobacco via
store purchase—an act that younger users generally find more diffi-

36.

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Youth Access to Tobacco 5
(1992) (“Florida and Vermont are the only States enforcing their laws
statewide.”).

37.

ADAMHA Reorganization Act § 1926 (setting state requirements and
penalties for failing to meet those requirements).

38.

Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., FFY 2013
Annual Synar Reports: Tobacco Sales to Youth 2 fig.1 (2013).

39.

Teen Use Press Release, supra note 12, at tbl.13.

40.

Lindsay F. Stead & Tim Lancaster, A Systematic Review of Interventions for Preventing Tobacco Sales to Minors, 9 Tobacco Control
169, 175 (2000).
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cult to get away with and less frequent users might find unnecessary.41
Indeed, one study associated increased enforcement with the prevalence of fewer frequent users.42 Perhaps counterintuitively, it is not
older but younger youth who have displayed stronger reductions in
use,43 perhaps as a function of younger youth having to rely on older
youth to procure tobacco for them. Thus, even if enforcement policies
do not prevent youth tobacco initiation, they may still delay initiation44 or limit youth from intensifying their habit.
B. Controlling Other Forms of Access

By most measures, social sources are a bigger provider of alcohol
and tobacco to youth than store access is. A “social source” is an
umbrella term that includes many other more specific methods,
including adult supply from home, proxy buyers, and peer-to-peer
exchange. The NSDUH household survey illustrates the prevalence of
these methods, asking past-month cigarette smokers which sources
they had used in the past thirty days. In 2003, the most recent year
the question was asked, the most common response was to have
“bummed” cigarettes from friends (60%), followed by purchasing from
a store (53.3%) and purchasing from a friend, family member, or
classmate (30.5%).45 Alcohol access also shows high rates of noncommercial exchange but lower rates of store purchase. According to
NSDUH, past-month under-twenty-one alcohol users were most likely
to have acquired their most recent drink by receiving it for free
(71.8%) and somewhat likely to have purchased from friends or a
stranger (19.6%) but much less likely to have purchased from a store
(6.4%).46
41.

Jean L. Forster et al., The Effects of Community Policies to Reduce
Youth Access to Tobacco, 88 Am. J. Pub. Health 1193, 1196–97
(1998).

42.

K. Michael Cummings et al., Is the Prevalence of Youth Smoking
Affected by Efforts to Increase Retailer Compliance with a Minor’s
Access Law?, 5 Nicotine & Tobacco Res. 465, 469 (2003).

43.

David G. Altman et al., The Relationship Between Tobacco Access and
Use Among Adolescents: A Four Community Study, 48 Soc. Sci. &
Med. 759, 772 (1999).

44.

See Douglas Tutt et al., Restricting the Retail Supply of Tobacco to
Minors, 30 J. Pub. Health Pol’y 68, 77 (2009) (suggesting this trend
can be found in studies of the effects of increased enforcement on agerestricted tobacco sales in parts of Australia and New Zealand).

45.

Jessica Guilfoyle, Where Do Youth Smokers Get Their Cigarettes?,
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (June 15, 2012), http://www.slo
county.ca.gov/Assets/PH/TCP/WhereDoYouthGetTheirCigarettes2012.pdf.

46.

SAMHSA, supra note 13 (authors’ calculations). Alcohol drinkers are
asked specifically about how they acquired their most recent acquisition.
Answers to this question are mutually exclusive and so are not directly
comparable to the question on cigarette acquisition.
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Let’s be specific about how this access occurs. Conceptually, there
are two different ways for users to purchase from a third party or
“proxy buyer”: (1) by seeking out a specific person known to resell
alcohol or (2) by waiting outside an alcohol store and soliciting
incoming shoppers, a method known as “shoulder tapping.” The
NSDUH does not distinguish between these two methods, but a study
of Minnesota youth found that one in three tobacco seekers regularly
shoulder tapped, more than twice as many reporting direct purchase.47
A study with alcohol found success rates of 8 percent when soliciting
the first adult to enter the store and 19 percent when targeting males
appearing to be between twenty-one and thirty years old.48
Now that we have covered the methods by which underage users
obtain alcohol and tobacco, we naturally should ask, “How and to
what extent can policy limit those behaviors?” PUP laws—laws
against underage possession, use, and purchase—attempt to do just
that but are not unambiguously effective. Some studies have found a
statistical correlation between PUP laws and tobacco use49 but not
others.50
However, if PUP laws are indeed effective in reducing underage
access, it is through one of two causal pathways: (1) changing social
norms to make access and use less attractive to youth and (2)
imposing a threat of criminal risk sufficient to deter youth from
attempting access. The first proposition is also unclear. Some argue
that prohibitory laws have a declarative effect that changes social
norms to make tobacco use less attractive. Others fear that such laws
47.

Patricia A. Harrison et al., The Relative Importance of Social Versus
Commercial Sources in Youth Access to Tobacco, Alcohol, and Other
Drugs, 31 Preventive Med. 39, 43 (2000).

48.

Traci L. Toomey et al., Propensity for Obtaining Alcohol Through
Shoulder Tapping, 31 Alcoholism: Clinical & Experimental Res.
1218, 1220 (2007).

49.

See William C. Livingood et al., Impact Study of Tobacco Possession
Law Enforcement in Florida, 28 Health Educ. & Behav. 733, 743
(2001) (finding lower use of tobacco with higher levels of control and
enforcement); see also Leonard A. Jason et al., Effects of Youth Tobacco
Access and Possession Policy Interventions on Heavy Adolescent
Smokers, 6 Int’l J. Envtl. Res. & Pub. Health 1, 6 (2009) (“These
studies support the efficacy of combined approaches involving efforts to
both reduce youth access to tobacco as well as provide consequences for
adolescent use of tobacco. This current research suggests that the
enforcement of PUP laws does impact youth who smoke 20 or more
cigarettes daily.”).

50.

See, e.g., N.H. Gottlieb et al., Minors’ Tobacco Possession Law
Violation and Intentions to Smoke: Implications for Tobacco Control, 13
Tobacco Control 237, 240, 243 (2004) (finding that threat of citation
for possession of cigarettes had no statistically significant impact on
youth smoking rates).

556

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 3·2015
Controlling Underage Access to Legal Cannabis

brand drug use as a “forbidden fruit,” making it more attractive to
youth seeking rebellion.
On the second point, of deterring youth via criminal risk, we have
grounds for skepticism. Deterrence comes in two types: general deterrence intends to reduce the unwanted activity among the public at
large; specific deterrence refers to behavior change among individuals
caught and punished for committing the unwanted activity. Some
have found evidence for a specific deterrent.51 Yet, in the case of alcohol and tobacco, there are very many users seeking the drug but so
few are ever caught and punished for it. This limits the effect of a
specific deterrent and makes a general deterrent both more important
and more difficult to impose: when levels of an unwanted activity are
high, the enforcement required to effect a general deterrent often
exceeds the resources available to law enforcement.52 Indeed, Wakefield and Giovino were unable to find any jurisdictions implementing
PUP laws that caught enough violators as to do so.53 For instance,
California’s Alcohol Beverage Control made roughly 430 arrests in
shoulder-tapping stings in 2013, which might represent a 0.5% chance
of detection.54
Interactive dynamics between law-breakers and law-enforcers
makes a general deterrent even more difficult. Law-breakers respond
to the threat of detection by making deals out of sight of police and
only with people they already trust; so even if police succeed in

51.

See, e.g., Leonard A. Jason et al., Do Fines for Violating PossessionUse-Purchase Laws Reduce Youth Tobacco Use?, 37 J. Drug Educ.
393, 397–98 (2007) (analyzing the effects of fines as a deterrent).

52.

See Mark A.R. Kleiman, Enforcement Swamping: A Positive-Feedback
Mechanism in Rates of Illicit Activity, 17 Mathematical &
Computer Modelling 65, 70 (1993) (finding that adjudication and
nonpecuniary penalties often carry a high cost and that ticketing enforcement regimes are zero sum games for municipalities).

53.

M. Wakefield & G. Giovino, Teen Penalties for Tobacco Possession,
Use, and Purchase: Evidence and Issues, Tobacco Control, June
2003 (Supplement 1), at i6, i11.

54.

According to the 2011–2012 NSDUH, 185,000 respondents under
twenty-one years old in California reported acquiring their last alcoholic
beverage by giving money to some unrelated person twenty-one years or
older and having them make the purchase on their behalf. If we were to
make the assumptions (1) conservatively, that each respondent acquired
only once per year this way; (2) that all such purchases were of the
“shoulder-tapping” variety (i.e., solicited outside the store); (3) that
each buyer made only one purchase; and (4) that 2011 and 2012 had the
same number of arrests as in 2013, then each buyer would face a 0.46%
chance of arrest. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs.
Admin., Results from the 2012 National Survey on Drug Use
and Health: Summary of National Findings (2012) (authors’
calculations).
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scaring people from giving alcohol or tobacco to a minor in public,
they might still feel comfortable doing so at home.
Further, when sellers are profit-motivated, they are harder to
deter. Profit-motivated sellers may choose to tolerate significant risk
so long as the activity remains profitable on balance.55 Moreover,
removing (via incarceration or deterrent) one specific individual distributor becomes less valuable, since doing so to some extent opens up
a market niche for another distributor.
C. Interactions Between Store and Social Sources

How do these two types of access relate? In some sense, they are
complements: easy access to cannabis encourages more youth to use,
some of whom will themselves become cannabis sellers. Because
cannabis is usually sold within someone’s own social network, and
social networks are usually within the same age group, preventing one
youth from purchasing from a store might have the downstream effect
of blocking one method of supply to his friends.
In another sense, they are substitutes: when store access is cut off,
underage users turn to these other sources instead. A young user
might have a friend willing to share or sell; but if that is too hard,
older actors may step up to the role of distributor. Marsh et al. argue
that reductions in store access can drive up the price of informally
traded product, thereby increasing profits and attracting more distributors.56
Since both arguments proceed logically from sound premises,
resolving that contradiction is an empirical question: “effective
enforcement against store purchase causes some youth to direct their
efforts to social access instead; does the increase in social access
outweigh the decrease in store access?” On this experts are not in
agreement. Some would answer yes,57 others no,58 and still others are

55.

See Peter Reuter & Mark A.R. Kleiman, Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of Drug Enforcement, 7 Crime & Just. 289, 302–03
(1986) (discussing the different types of risk calculations involved in the
illicit drug trade).

56.

Louise Marsh et al., “When You’re Desperate You’ll Ask Anybody”:
Young People’s Social Sources of Tobacco, 37 Austl. & N.Z. J. Pub.
Health 155, 159 (2013).

57.

See, e.g., Caroline M. Fichtenberg & Stanton A. Glantz, Youth Access
Interventions Do Not Affect Youth Smoking, 109 Pediatrics 1088, 1091
(2002) (finding no benefit to “[y]outh access interventions” in reducing
prevalence of teen tobacco use); see also P.M. Ling et al., It Is Time to
Abandon Youth Access Programmes, 11 Tobacco Control 3, 3 (2002)
(discussing how youth access programs “do not affect teen smoking
prevalence”).

58.

See, e.g., J.R. DiFranza, Letter, Is It Time to Abandon Youth Access
Programmes?, 11 Tobacco Control 282, 282 (2002) (discussing flaws
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agnostic.59 Nor is there consensus on the subtly different question,
“Does decreased retail availability actually lead to decreased underage
use?” This has been the subject of econometric analyses, again with
some finding significant statistical associations60 but others finding no
relationship whatsoever.61
Given the disagreement among experts with regard to alcohol and
tobacco, it seems impossible to estimate with any precision the net
effects of store enforcement on cannabis. One might suspect that it
has some effect (i.e., that alternative sources do not substitute
completely), but the magnitude of that effect may or may not be
significant. Some policies (like PUP laws) might help tip the scales
toward a net reduction in use, but a decision maker concerned with
both health and criminal outcomes may find the cost in excess of the
returns.

VII. Implications for Washington’s and
Colorado’s Ability to Control Cannabis
Supply to Underage Users
Comparisons between cannabis and tobacco or alcohol have their
uses and limits. Some of the issues at hand are fundamental and nonspecific to any given substance, such as how youth seek and find
prohibited substances, and how vendors respond to the threat of

in P.M. Ling et al.’s methodology that renders the study scientifically
invalid).
59.

See, e.g., Paula M. Lantz et al., Investing in Youth Tobacco Control: A
Review of Smoking Prevention and Control Strategies, 9 Tobacco
Control 47, 60 (2000) (noting that prior antismoking programs
directed at adolescents “have had mixed results” and “that no one
approach is likely to reverse that finding”).

60.

See, e.g., Joseph R. DiFranza et al., Enforcement of Underage Sales
Laws as a Predictor of Daily Smoking Among Adolescents: A National
Study, 9 BMC Pub. Health 107 (2009) (finding that increasing
merchant compliance with the law decreases youth smoking rates); C.
Dent & A. Biglan, Relation Between Access to Tobacco and Adolescent
Smoking, 13 Tobacco Control 334 (2005); Leonard A. Jason, Steven
B. Pokorny & Michael E. Schoeny, Evaluating the Effects of
Enforcements and Fines on Youth Smoking, 13 Critical Pub. Health
33 (2003); Steven B. Pokorny, Leonard A. Jason & Michael E. Schoeny,
The Relation of Retail Tobacco Availability on Initiation and Continued
Smoking, 32 J. Clinical Child Adolescent Psychol. 193 (2003).

61.

See, e.g., Carey Conley Thomson et al., Effect of Local Youth-Access
Regulations on Progression to Established Smoking Among Youths in
Massachusetts, 16 Tobacco Control 119, 123–25 (2007) (finding “no
significant association between . . . regulations and adolescents’ initiation of smoking”); see also Fichtenberg & Glantz, supra note 57, at 1091
(finding no benefit to “[y]outh access interventions”).
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sanctions. But the comparison is not perfect. Applying these lessons
to cannabis control requires considering these differences.
A. Controlling Store Purchase Will Be Easier Under New Regulations

Both Colorado and Washington have many fewer licensed vendors
for cannabis—capped at 334 in Washington62 and approximately 306
and growing in Colorado63—than for alcohol or tobacco, whose
licensees number in the thousands. That might be important. Lantz et
al. have identified the most effective retail enforcement programs as
those that confront a smaller pool of vendors, with penalties that
gradually increase with each offense.64 Lancaster and Stead believe
that density of vendors matters, since densely located vendors allow
youth to select from a wider number of retailers.65
For cannabis, license penalties for selling to minors begin more
severe and more quickly escalate to license revocation. In Washington,
license revocation becomes available after five underage tobacco sales66
or four alcohol sales67 in a two-year period, compared with only three
cannabis sales in a three-year period.68 In Colorado, the maximum
penalty facing vendors making underage tobacco sales is a $15,000
fine,69 while four underage alcohol sales in a two-year period can merit
license revocation70; underage cannabis sale can return a fine up to
$100,000 or license revocation according to discretion of the State
Licensing Authority.71
Also, because cannabis stores are not allowed to sell anything
besides cannabis, underage users are not even allowed to enter,
constructing a first-line defense against the opportunity for illegal
62.

FAQs on I-502, Wash. St. Liquor Control Board (last visited Jan.
22, 2015), http://www.liq.wa.gov/marijuana/faqs_i-502 (“334 retail licenses will be issued. The number of retail locations was determined
using a formula that distributes the number of locations proportionate
to the most populous cities within each county.”).

63.

MED Licensed Retail Marijuana Stores as of December 1, 2014, Colo.
Dep’t Revenue Enforcement Division (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.
colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/Stores.pdf (listing 306 licensed
retail marijuana stores).

64.

Lantz et al., supra note 59, at 58.

65.

Stead & Lancaster, supra note 40, at 175.

66.

Wash. Admin. Code § 314-55-525 (2013).

67.

Wash. Admin. Code § 314-29-020 (2009).

68.

Wash. Rev. Code § 70.155.100 (2006).

69.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-13-12 (2011).

70.

Colo. Code Regs. § 203-2-47-604 (2015).

71.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-13-12 (2011); Colo. Code Regs. § 212-2
(2013).
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purchase. Preventing youth from buying from cannabis stores may be
more like preventing them from buying a drink at a bar than buying
a can of beer at a convenience store.
B. Controlling Cannabis Resale Is Especially Difficult

Cannabis gray markets might be difficult to control for the same
reasons that have helped its black markets thrive despite law
enforcement pressure: low-level distribution is moderately profitable,
operationally simple, and carries relatively low criminal risk.
Cannabis is compact, especially compared with alcohol but even
compared with tobacco. A Ziploc sandwich bag can easily hold one
ounce of mid-grade cannabis, which might sell for approximately $250
and represent fifty to seventy joints.72 One-eighth of that might last
several weeks for a frequent user, whereas the same volume of
cigarettes would last just a few days. Moreover, the few transactions
necessary to provide for underage users are difficult to detect, as most
youth acquire their cannabis from friends or relatives, as with
tobacco.
A significant number of users old enough to buy state-licensed
cannabis already partake in resale. NSDUH data reveal that younger
users are much more likely to have sold some of their most recent
purchase: the rate for users under eighteen (10.8%) is nearly twice
that for users between twenty-one and twenty-five (6.3%), which is in
turn twice that for users thirty-five or older (1.9%). The undertwenty-one prohibition makes nearly half (40%) of these resellers
ineligible as proxy buyers but still leaves 587,000 over-twenty-one
users who resold in 2013.73
One might theorize that as long as there remains a price
differential between cannabis on store shelves and on street corners,
those users with low incomes and who are already buying cannabis
anyway might be willing to arbitrage prices by selling to friends or
friends-of-friends. NSDUH responses show nearly 1.4 million pastmonth cannabis users aged twenty-one to twenty-five with incomes
under $20,000, and another 1.3 million with incomes between $20,000
and $50,000.74

72.

Data for the Price of Weed in United States, Price of Weed, http://
www.priceofweed.com/prices/United-States.html (last visited Feb. 19,
2015). The authors’ calculations are based on the PriceOfWeed.com
price index, which lists an ounce of medium quality cannabis at $257.68.
Mid-grade cannabis is estimated by the author to have 10% THC.
Washington and Colorado establish servings sizes of 10mg THC.

73.

SAMHSA, supra note 13 (authors’ calculations).

74.

Id.
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VIII. Comparison of Policies/Scenarios
Before reviewing policy alternatives, it is useful to first identify
some hypothetical policy outcomes, comparing them in terms of
desirability and plausibility. The table below charts different endgame scenarios for states with legalized cannabis. The columns
represent the volume or ease of access via three different illegal
channels: gray markets, black markets, and underage purchase from
legal stores. Each row represents a scenario.
As a foil, the table includes two rows for tobacco, distinguishing
the situation before versus after passage of the Synar Amendment.
The Synar Amendment sharply cut underage youth’s direct access to
tobacco (from “substantial” to “minimal”) thanks to states increasing
enforcement of laws against sale to minors, but it had no meaningful
effect on indirect access via the gray market. (It also had no effect on
black market access, which was effectively nil for tobacco both before
and after the Synar Amendment.)
We similarly chart hypothetical scenarios in cannabis control.
Each trades off between access to gray and black markets and hence
also between qualitatively different types of societal harms (i.e.,
underage cannabis use versus black market activity). None of these
scenarios can be said to be objectively better than the others, except
for the post-legalization “impossible ideal,” which is included just to
illustrate the best possible scenario: minimal access through every
illegal channel.
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Table 1: Ease of Access Under Specific Enforcement Regimes
Direct
(Underage)
Access to
Legal
Stores

Indirect Access
to Legal
Product via
Gray Market
Diversion

Black Market Access

Tobacco
Pre-Synar

Substantial Substantial

N/A

Post-Synar

Minimal

Substantial

N/A

Impossible Ideal Minimal

Minimal

Minimal

Pre-legalization

N/A

Modest in some
medical states
(WA, CA, OR,
CO)

Substantial

Option 1:
“Aggressive”
Enforcement

Minimal

Minimal

Substantial

Option 2:
“Permissive”
Enforcement

Minimal

Substantial

Substantial initially;
falling as the black
market is driven out
of business

Cannabis

The “Pre-legalization” scenario reflects the situation before
legalization (and before de facto quasi-legalization via very permissive
medical marijuana regimes). Access was dominated by black markets;
underage access via stores was nil because there were no state-licensed
stores. “Option 1” and “Option 2” demonstrate the two principle
possible outcomes of cannabis legalization. Option 1 typifies an
“aggressive” enforcement approach, which attempts to limit all channels of underage access. Option 2 demonstrates a “permissive” approach, grudgingly tolerating leakage from cannabis stores and so
putting greater pressure on cannabis from black markets.
So, were we to choose between those two, how would we pick?
Option 2 allows equal or greater levels of cannabis access at first,
but its outcomes improve over time as underage users migrate from
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black market supply to diverted state-licensed supply. Black market
volumes retreat, as do associated criminal revenues, acts of illegal
production and trafficking, and related arrests. Things also change
from the prospective of the potential user. An eighteen-year-old might
still easily find a sibling or classmate willing to resell him store-bought
cannabis, but instead of receiving the usual Ziploc baggie, he or she
will be buying cannabis that is tested and labeled for potency.
Option 1 is more ambitious. It attempts to accomplish with
cannabis what we failed to do with alcohol or tobacco. Success seems
especially unlikely given the increasingly tolerant attitudes toward
cannabis use. A heavy majority (69%) of Americans believe that
cannabis is less harmful to a person’s health than alcohol.75 Further,
cannabis came dead last (8%) in a nationwide poll that asked Americans which was the most harmful substance between cannabis,
tobacco (49%), alcohol (24%), and even sugar (15%).76 If controlling
cannabis gray markets depends on public attitudes being hostile to
cannabis use, we would be off to a bad start.
Even if gray markets could be stamped out, there is the
disadvantage of fortifying black markets. Unless there is a big drop-off
in under-twenty-one cannabis use—a reversal from the recent upward
trend—Option 1 would lock into place the nearly one-quarter of
today’s current black market that services that demographic,
representing roughly $6–10 billion in illegal revenues. That also helps
black markets service the remaining (adult) demand for black market
cannabis (e.g., by undercutting legal prices if taxes are high enough).
So, given a simple choice between Options 1 and 2, even a
moderate concern for illicit markets suggests choosing Option 2. What
makes that choice even more clear is that Option 2 is also more
realistic.
One might then ask what tactics would compose “permissive”
enforcement? Operationally, authorities should continue to combat
underage store purchase yet refrain from tackling gray market diversion. Law enforcement should vigorously investigate stores that sell to
underage users but not the parent suspected of passing along cannabis
to their nineteen-year-old, or the college student with the severalounce-per-week purchasing habit obviously too large for personal
consumption. A strategy that maintains these priorities in the long
term might be dubbed “permissive.”

75.

Seth Motel, Six Facts About Marijuana, Pew Res. Center (Nov. 5
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/11/05/6-facts-about
-marijuana/.

76.

Beth Reinhard, WSJ Poll: Candy Is Dandy but Pot Is Less Harmful
Wall St. J. (March 12, 2014, 6:07 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire
/2014/03/12/wsj-poll-cand-is-dandy-but-pot-is-less-harmful/tab/print/?mg
=blogs-wsj&url=http%253A%252F%252Fblogs.wsj.com%25%E2%80%A6.
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Yet, we need not permanently confine ourselves to such modest
aims. In the long run, if and when gray markets have largely taken
the place of black markets as the primary supply to youth and young
adults, targeting gray market supply might be more attractive. Fewer
underage black market buyers has wide-reaching implications: for
those continuing to sell illicit cannabis, smaller economies of scale and
so higher costs of producing and distribution cannabis; for street-level
cannabis retailers, fewer with reliable contacts to illicit producers; and
for end customers, a growing preference for state-licensed cannabis
due to falling prices and perhaps even social norms increasingly hostile to buying illicit cannabis. So, an alternative approach would respond to these changing circumstances by ramping up controls against
gray market diversion. We might call that the “patient” approach.
Then, should policy be permissive of gray markets or merely
patient? The patient approach is superior if everything went as
planned, but in practice it carries additional risk. It might backfire if
policymakers were too early in imposing controls on gray market
supply, perhaps due to political pressures, or overestimating the damage to black market production and distribution rings, or underestimating their ability to bounce back to larger scales of business. In
either case, policymakers need not decide now. So long as one is
committed to the opening steps common to both approaches, and is
satisfied in making at least a short-run concession to gray market
access, decisions about what to do in the long run could be saved for
the long run.

Conclusion
As cannabis legalization is adopted state-by-state, it creates competing harms and benefits. On the one hand, there is concern that
easier access to cannabis could increase use by youth and young
adults; on the other hand, reducing illicit market share and minimizing cannabis-related arrests and incarcerations are also worthwhile
goals. Nor is this simply a state–federal conflict, as both sets of sometimes competing goals are simultaneously adopted in the letter of
both state legalization bills and federal enforcement guidelines.
Laws in Colorado and Washington clearly prohibit cannabis sales
to users under twenty-one. But making a rule is not the same as
enforcing it. Legally produced cannabis will still reach minors, either
because minors succeed in purchasing directly from licensed retail
outlets or because adult buyers illegally give or resell what they have
legally purchased. That raises important questions: if efforts to limit
access are inevitably flawed, how vigorously should they be pursued?
Should efforts focus simultaneously on store purchase and gray and
black markets; or, knowing that pushing down on one channel causes
the other to pop up, should they pick just the most dangerous
methods of access and focus on that?
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Three alternate approaches can be identified, varying according to
the style of enforcement applied to gray market access: one that is
aggressive, one permissive, and one patient. We propose that the
aggressive approach is unlikely to achieve its desired outcome—
simultaneously shutting down both gray and black markets—and,
furthermore, it may backfire. A permissive approach avoids inflaming
the black market and avoids some of the harms associated with a
vigorous law enforcement response. A patient approach offers all that
and possibly more: by imposing controls on gray market access but
only after the retreat of black market activity, it makes possible a
long-run scenario with lower levels of access across all channels.
Of course, it is a difficult sell politically for authorities to
systematically ignore gray market supply to youth. To the public,
that may seem like a failure of imagination or political will. State
authorities are unlikely to publicly acknowledge that they plan for
licensed stores to provide cannabis for underage users, albeit
indirectly; likewise, the federal government is probably loath to open
loopholes in the enforcement guidelines set out in the later Cole
Memo. A more plausible scenario is for governments to simply conceal
the controversial details. This might be described as form of “don’t
ask, don’t tell.” The federal government does not ask states if they
are succeeding at controlling underage gray market access; in turn,
states do not tell that they are not even trying. And in public
statements, everyone could claim to be doing their best to stop underage cannabis access of all kinds.
Of course there can be no certainty about the predictions made
above; underage consumers and legal, gray-market, and illegal cannabis vendors might not respond precisely as we imagine to various
hypothetical situations. Still, it seems likely that there are trade-offs
between efforts to stop underage purchase, to stop diversion from
state-licensed stores, and to stop illicit production and sale. A
corollary is that the goals of minimizing underage cannabis use and
minimizing illicit market activity cannot be simultaneously pursued
with maximal effectiveness for each. Perhaps the most reasonable
policy response would be to settle these issues sequentially, first
seeking reductions in black market activity while also preventing
direct access by minors to licensed sales, and only later turning to
focus on minimizing underage access to cannabis through the gray
market.
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